转移支付与地方政府公共支出偏向——基于面板门槛效应的分析

本文利用1994~2007年县级数据,以财政自给率作为门槛变量,基于双重面板门槛模型,分析了我国转移支付与地方公共支出的非线性关系。研究结果表明:转移支付对地方公共支出的影响存在显著的门槛效应;转移支付对基本建设支出和行政管理支出的促进作用都更为显著,在某种程度上强化了地方政府行为选择和公共支出结构的扭曲;我国转移支付对公共支出的影响存在地区差异,转移支付不能有效激励经济欠发达地区提供基本公共服务,因而转移支付制度在一定程度上与基本公共服务均等化目标激励不相容。     

Optimal Expenditure Patterns of a Double-Path Engineering Project

The optimal expenditure pattern for a double-path engineering project, i.e., a project composed of a nonroutine risky R&D path and a routine nonrisky preparatory path, manufacturing related or marketing related, is studied via the calculus of variations to derive a set of twin second-order nonlinear differential equations whose solution yields the optimal joint expenditure. Assuming independence between the risky and nonrisky paths, a constant return per unit time, a gamma-type unimodal conditional-completion density function for the R&D activity, and the principle of diminishing returns on the effort, we find an interesting interplay between the two paths for the peak position and termination of the expenditures. Counterintuitively, we find that the peak expenditure of the R&D path does not necessarily precede that of the preparatory path, although both path expenditure peaks obey the well-known Kamien–Schwartz theorem. That is, for both paths, the expenditure peak positions precede always the peak of the conditional-completion density function of the R&D path.     

New approach for the assignment of new European agricultural subsidies using scores from data envelopment analysis: Application to olive-growing farms in Andalusia (Spain)

More than 60% of olive-growing farms in Andalusia (Spain) would have negative returns without European agricultural subsidies. Agenda 2000 criteria imply that agricultural subsidies currently play the role of enhancing the production quality and the environmental and social values of agriculture. Although the necessity of the modulation of subsidies is stated, the EU regulations do not state which objective criteria should be used or how they should be measured, despite the fact that regulations demand objectivity in this measurement.     

STEADY STATE AND INTERTEMPORAL MANAGEMENT MODELS FOR MARINE FISHERIES

Abstract Steady state and dynamic management models are developed for analyzing the Malaysian marine fisheries. These models originate from the theoretical concepts of the natural resource economics namely the open access, limited entry and the intertemporal fishery models. Such management models are deemed necessary because of the need to sustain the depleting resource and degrading environment. Marine fisheries had been managed under open access for a long time before government intervention took effect sometime during the 1960s. Open access and government intervention during the earlier phase of economic development contributed to the immediate pressure on fisheries. Community development programs geared to alleviate poverty among the fishermen apparently contradicted the effort of sustaining fisheries. Even today this fundamental management objective of sustainable development of fishery resource is not fully adhered to. This study suggests that ability to sustain fishery requires government intervention that can direct resource use to steady state or intertemporal optimal levels.     

政府补贴对风险投资的影响机制研究

建立了风险投资者与创业者之间的契约关系理论模型,研究了政府补贴政策的影响机制.研究证明政府补贴在提高风险投资者期望收益的同时,也提高了创业者的期望收益,这一政策也使得更多的投资项目值得风险资本去投资.因此,政府补贴增加了创业企业对风险资本的需求,能够促进风险投资业的发展.     

枢复宁和甲氧氯普胺预防化疗所致呕吐的费用结果分析

通过对比枢复宁及甲氧氯普胺30例抗癌化疗所致的恶心呕吐的疗效及费用，确认使用枢复宁具有较高性能价格比。     

递归的核回归模型及其应用

本文我们首先构造了两个递归的回归模型 ,然后将其应用于湖南省城镇居民消费性支出 ,得到了较好的拟合效果     

Determination of optimal penalties for antitrust violations in a dynamic setting

We analyze a differential game describing the interactions between a firm that might be violating competition law and the antitrust authority. The objective of the authority is to minimize social costs (loss in consumer surplus) induced by an increase in prices above marginal costs. It turns out that the penalty schemes which are used now in EU and US legislation appear not to be as efficient as desired from the point of view of minimization of consumer loss from price-fixing activities of the firm. In particular, we prove that full compliance behavior is not sustainable as a Nash Equilibrium in Markovian strategies over the whole planning period, and, moreover, that it will never arise as the long-run steady-state equilibrium of the model. We also investigate the question which penalty system enables us to completely deter cartel formation in a dynamic setting. We found that this socially desirable outcome can be achieved in case the penalty is an increasing function of the degree of offence and is negatively related to the probability of law enforcement.     

政府补贴下闭环供应链回收渠道的选择策略

本文考虑由单一制造商、单一零售商以及单一第三方构成的闭环供应链系统,主要研究其回收渠道的选择问题,并综合分析政府补贴政策对不同主体回收策略选择的影响。本文建立了不同主体回收的决策模型,对集中决策和分散决策下的最优策略进行了理论分析,并通过数值实验验证了如下理论结果:在政府补贴的不同区间内,决策者(政府、消费者和政策制定者等)所选择的回收渠道可能会截然不同;政府补贴越少,决策者越倾向于选择零售商回收;政府补贴越多,决策者则越倾向于选择第三方回收。     

公众参与视角下的央地环境规制博弈分析

本文首先构建环境规制中中央政府和地方政府的两方演化博弈模型,并在此基础上将公众作为第三方参与主体,构建中央政府、地方政府和公众三方演化博弈模型,详细比较两方和三方博弈模型的区别,探究各个主体策略行为的影响因素。研究发现:(1)未有公众参与下,地方政府策略选择主要受地方政府积极执行成本、环境收益、经济损失,消极执行的环境政绩损失,中央政府监管力度、治理补贴和对地方政府的处罚等因素影响;中央政府的监管策略主要受到严格监管的成本以及对地方政府的治理补贴和处罚等因素影响。引入公众参与后,在央地两方博弈的基础上,地方政府环境规制执行策略的影响因素还增加了地方政府被举报后所受到的追加处罚,中央政府监管策略的影响因素还增加了中央政府监管力度、对地方政府的追加处罚以及中央政府的公信力损失。(2)未有公众参与下,中央政府严格监管的概率随地方政府积极执行概率的增大而减小。引入公众参与后,中央政府严格监管率随地方政府积极执行概率的增大而增大。说明在公众参与下,地方政府积极执行环境规制对中央政府严格监管产生的抑制作用转变成了促进作用。(3)地方政府积极执行的概率、中央政府严格监管的概率都随公众举报概率的增大而增大。说明公众参与不仅对地方政府承担环保责任具有促进作用,而且有利于促使中央政府落实环境治理政策。